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ABSTRACT

To understand developments in West Germany since World War II, one must consider numerous social, political, economic, military, and educational variables. Important among these are the decline in output orientation, increase in interpersonal political involvement, decline in value placed on politics, stress on democratic decision making, reduction of support for European political integration, and democratization of education. Characteristics of Germany's political structure include a political party system based on proportional representation, a constitution which combines central institutions with federalism, and a high aggregation of interest among leaders from government, banking, business, labor, and industry. In the arena of social policy, post World War II developments include increases in government supported pension plans, a national health system, and increases in numbers of students receiving higher education. United States/West German political relations since World War II have been based on mutual acceptance of the need for European security, in spite of differences over particular military and financial policies. Analysis of these factors indicates that West Germany is a stable nation whose governmental and constitutional structure provides ample opportunities for dealing with political issues. (DB)

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POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND SECURITY POLICIES

Edited by
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The discussion following the papers focuses primarily on the first two papers.

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The Conference sessions were organized by Professor Alfred Diamant of the Department of Political Science of Indiana University, Bloomington.

German Studies Notes make available to interested persons and institutions a variety of research reports and working papers produced as part of the project, "West Germany and the United States: A Systems Comparison Analysis." Topics relate to recent sociopolitical and socioeconomic questions, problems of fiscal policy, political education, the environment, public administration, and other social and broadly cultural themes. The focus of these papers is on the sixties and seventies. Their principal purpose is to contribute to the dialogue between the two societies by offering analyses and alternatives based on our respective experiences.

Inquiries regarding project publications should be addressed to the Institute of German Studies.

Eberhard Reichmann,
Project Director and Editor-in-Chief

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POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN POLITICS

by

Rudolf Wildenmann
University of Mannheim

In Washington D.C., recently, I was confronted with a host of questions about whether Helmut Schmidt would stay in power or even intends to stay in power. Although interesting, I do not intend to try to answer these questions in this paper. However, I do intend to focus on certain structural, institutional and procedural features of the Federal Republic which may cast some light on them.

To understand the Federal Republic today, we must focus on a number of very important structural features. One certainly is its party system. Here I mean not only the individual parties, that is the CDU, the CSU, the SPD and the FDP, but the party system as a whole. In contemporary Europe, there is a good deal of variation in party systems. In some countries, there is a growing distance between the parties which has made the development and continuance of effective government increasingly difficult. Compared to this standard, the West German party system seems to be in very good shape, for it is a system which has proven itself capable of producing alternative governments. By this I mean it has produced a situation in which if one party falls, there will be an alternative one to replace it. In this sense, the party system which has developed in Germany since 1949 really is very new and different. And, it is this point which I have used to answer the questions about Schmidt's future that have been asked of me in Washington. I have always said that although I do not know whether Schmidt will stay in power, I do know that there will be an alternative government if he should fall. There is, therefore, a certain--and in my view important--"stability and reliability" to the contemporary German party system which has enormous implications for policymaking as well as for the maintenance of government offices.

However, this characterization of the German party system has been called into question recently. According to some people it does not function any more because as long as the SPD continues to join coalitions, there is almost no chance for the opposition party to take over in any general election. If one were to do a simulation of possible election results and their effect on the distribution of seats, the argument goes, the probability of getting an alternative majority for a single party like the CDU--or for the SPD in the 1960's--is low. This has something to do with the electoral law we have in West Germany. It is not necessary to describe this law in detail here. It is only important to point out that some people have emphasized the asymmetric setup of the party system which makes it hard for the opposition to gain power.

I don't share this criticism and I don't think it is right because it is based on a shortsighted approach. One could always feel that the electorate believed that the government might change from one election to the next. Nevertheless, it has led to an enormous movement and stirred up a lot of noise in the last half year. According to Franz Josef Strauss, the leader of the Bavarian CSU, we must overcome this situation by creating a new party. In short, the CSU must fight elections in all states of the Federal Republic.

As I said before, from the point of view of flexibility in the party system, especially with respect to voting behavior, I have to reject this critical view. There is a high probability that the CDU could have made it in 1976. After all, it was held in higher esteem than the SPD during this period. The CDU was not successful in 1976 for a variety of reasons, one of them, certainly, that its leader could not match the reputation and popularity of Helmut Schmidt, the chancellor. This was one of the important factors. There were undoubtedly others, for example, the distribution of voting behavior, but this factor should not be excluded. There is still a very high propensity to change in the German population, and it is quite clear that in times of election, this flexibility is bound to be within the the two existing coalitions, more or less.

This certainly was not written in the textbooks on the development of the Federal Republic. In Germany we have evolved a unique situation, that is, a system of alternative party governments based on proportional representation. In a proportional representation system, one would normally expect a much higher fractionalization of the party system than we have. Hence, the current situation must be due, to a considerable degree, to voting behavior. As a means of strengthening the system, all of the parties have been interested in concentration, defractionalization, since 1949. But, this outcome has been due mainly to the voting behavior of the population. There is, therefore, a certain identification with the existing party system in contemporary Germany. This is a different kind of identification than the Ann Arbor people postulate, but it is an identification nevertheless.

Still, it has been said that since 1969, the estimation of the party system has gone down considerably in the eyes of the population. One can take any measure of this he likes, but the results will be the same: there is a certain distrust. Some people, prominent people, speak of Staatsverdrossenheit in West Germany right now. I cannot share this belief either. There is a certain type of critical attitude toward the party system which has been produced by various factors. But, we have no empirically reliable evidence that the trust in the party system has gone down to such a degree that we would have to worry about it and its basic structure.

So, this point about the party system is one thing I would really like to emphasize because we cannot understand development in West Germany without understanding this structural feature. Moreover, by contemporary European standards, the German party system is rather unique. I have just met with some friends from other countries in Florence. We are trying to find the major factors which explain the puzzling deviations and variations in the party systems of contemporary Europe. And, in this context, it is quite clear that the German party system is rather unique. It is hard for a German to say this because normally there is the underlying assumption that Germans cannot get along with parties. They still have the alienation from parties they had before, and the main parties are not, so to speak, their

true representatives. Furthermore, there is a certain amount of systematic criticism of the contemporary party system that we could discuss. But, I will leave this topic for now, since it will be discussed in other papers.

A second factor that needs to be considered in a discussion of the recent political development of the Federal Republic is the constitution. In the age of behavior studies--and, as you know, I have conducted quite a number of these studies in the last ten years--it is sometimes overlooked that institutions, structures and procedures can have an important effect on voting behavior, political behavior, and even the outcomes of political decision making. They control, in a way, the political and social processes. Let me illustrate.

In my view, 1949 provided a very good chance for creating new institutions. In retrospect, the work done by the Parliamentary Council seems to have been a very good consitutional achievement. Our constitution combines central institutions with federalism, and this is one reason that one does not find the kind of development in West Germany that one finds in England, Norway and other countries where there are strong regional and centrifugal tendencies. Different interests are aggregated on the federal level through a very complicated machinery which is not understood in many textbooks or even in this country sometimes.

This system, of course, has an obverse side. It puts enormous pressure on the party system to, as Gerhard Schroeder once said, homogenize the government in Bonn with the government in the Bundesrat. The current confrontation between the CDU Land governments and the federal government is reflected in the confrontation of the CDU federal government with the SPD Land governments in the 1950's. And, sometimes the forms of these confrontations are very similar. It is only our short memory that enables us to forget that there is a built-in friction in the kind of system that exists in Germany. Whether this means the German system is "good" in terms of separation of powers, or whether it means it promotes a tendency toward "immobilism," I shall not try to determine. In my view, the integration of

regional and state interests though our complicated machinery of parliament and Bundesrat has been quite successful.

As you know, German federalism was heavily criticized as a remnant of the American impact on the German constitution in the early 1950's. I do not share this criticism because even though the American military government pushed hard to have federalism incorporated into the constitution as a means of weakening the power of the central government, it has turned out to be a very good device, as often the effects of political decisions are completely different from the intentions with which these decisions were made. In my view, therefore, it is a balanced system. To me, great problems do not ensue if there is a struggle between the federal government and the state governments because if there is no struggle, there can be no aggregation of interests. And, there is an aggregation of the various regional, state and federal interests, even if it sometimes takes really curious forms. For instance, just before I left last week, the cultural ministry in Stuttgart said that Numerus Clausus should be regarded as an emergency question and should be handled by the federal government. This is an extraordinary position and it is really sort of funny to see how state governments give problems away when they are inconvenient or when they see federalism as a means to get money from Bonn.

Our governmental machinery has never existed before. If one looks at the German Reich of 1871, or even the Weimar Republic, it is clear that we presently have a quite different ball game. Hence, there will be a lot of noise or criticism because we now have a division of power, not just a division of parties. We have a division of power between the Bundesrat and the federal government, and, in many cases, this could have the effect of generating a sort of immobilism.

A third aspect of postwar political development in West Germany is not written in the constitution. Nevertheless, it differentiates the West German scenery from other European countries to a considerable degree. This is the high level of aggregation of interests. What do I mean by this?

According to the old theory of government, it is the parliament, or perhaps the parties, that has the responsibility for the integration of interests. West Germany, in contrast, has developed a rather unique executive branch--also a very unique legislative branch--which plays an important role in this process. The Central Bank and the Constitutional Court are also involved because their decisions really have important policy implications. For instance, the decision on party finances had an enormous structural effect on political life in West Germany.

Now, one of the problems of modern society is to bind together this variety of interests, to bind them together and bring them to bear at the point of political decision making. In West Germany, this high level of aggregation of interest is very much reflected in what is called "concerted action." Government officials, bank officials, business and trade union officials are not entitled, formally, to make laws, but once they have reached an agreement on, let's say, a framework for negotiating wages or distributing other resources, bargaining will take place within this framework. And, if some deviation occurs, a heavy sanction will be assessed, even by the public.

This procedure, of course, reduces individual participation in many instances. But, the real question for political science today, if it is to deal with modern problems and the problems of contemporary governments, is: can we afford a lower level of aggregation with a higher degree of participation where strategic groups participate a great deal and derive a sense of fulfillment from their participation when this participation is likely to have important implications for the outcomes of the procedures? Can we afford this or must we go to a very high level of aggregation which means either an elitist structure in decision making or a high degree of organizational discipline. Of course, this is not black and white. I have put it this way in order to make the point clear. Some of the problems which have come up in the Federal Republic in recent months illustrate what can happen with this sort of aggregation of interests. Differences have been encountered

between the government and the trade unions and even between the government and business. They have occurred because the alternatives in policymaking are quite clear and the positions of the various groups are held quite strongly. Nevertheless, it is important that we have and maintain the kind of machine we have in West Germany and thus the government puts an enormous effort into keeping it going.

Our structure is elitist and there is a high organizational demand and discipline on the part of the participants. But, within this organization we can observe, empirically, a rather high turnover of the people in permanent positions. In the 1950's and 1960's there was a good deal of talk in West Germany to the effect that people in prominent positions were staying there for a lifetime; it was said that there was not very much new influx. This is certainly not true. Two elite studies have demonstrated this. The continuance of people in very prominent positions over an extended period of time, like Herbert Wehner, is the exception; on the average, turnover occurs about every four years. I once said: "Who stays in power ages soon."

This problem was once of some concern but the situation has stabilized and this has something to do with the alternative party system I discussed earlier. This party system is a coherent and consistent one in my eyes. The constitution provided a framework in which this party system, based on a strong position in public life, could develop as the motor, the engine, the active part of the political decision making process in West Germany. The problem seems to be that the relationship between the party system inside the constitution and the population has been loosened recently. In part, this is because the value of politics for the individual is still very low. It is not the primary concern of most of the population. We have completely other concerns, families, church, profession, occupation, income and friends. So, despite the high turnout at election time, politics is still not too salient.

This point is relevant because Germany has recently been confronted with sudden, unpredictable demonstrations of a unique nature. They are not the same as the Buergerinitiativen of the 1972 election campaign which were organized, more or less, by strong interest groups, writers, politicians etc.

These demonstrations, which are manifestations of high citizen participation, are something quite different. They could be explained, or perhaps better described, as reflecting the lack of organizational involvement which the population has with the parties. We know, for example, that leading parliamentarians, individuals who have been in parliament for 20 or 25 years, are often not very well known in their own constituencies. The relationship between the parties and the people has always been different in Germany than many people would expect on the basis of their understanding of party systems. Indeed, one of the big problems of the fifties was to relate the parties to the population, to create a trust, a confidence and a consensus that this party system could work in the aftermath of the Third Reich. Hence, one explanation for the emergence of demonstrations as a mechanism of articulating political demands could be the continuation of this rather loose relationship between the parties and the people. Yet, we have to recognize that membership in the parties is still growing. Even the CDU, which has always had many fewer members than the SPD, now has about a million members. So, it seems this explanation is not altogether adequate.

In my view, an alternative explanation for this phenomenon can be found in an analysis of the present development of society. There seems to be a gap in the understanding of what the party system should be, on the one hand, and the development of society, on the other. First, it has long been observed that voting behavior in West Germany can be explained, to a very high degree, by changes in perceptions of economic development. This is a very good predictor of changes in political attitudes. If one looks for the reasons why this is so, one finds that a large portion of the population is very much dependent on economic growth. Let's call this phenomenon "individual risk security." Others would phrase it differently, but, for the time being, let's use this term. In addition to being dependent on economic growth, the population is very much dependent on the social system. There are many ways of improving individual risk security, personal property, etc. The major solution in West Germany has been to guarantee the society

collectively through a social security network. The strength of this system was clearly demonstrated during the recession of 1973-1974. I am not sure it would have been able to endure another two or three or more years of recession with a high rate of unemployment because the financial burden would have been too much. I am also not sure that further recession would not have had effects on the political behavior of the population. A small recession in 1966 was very instrumental in the emergence of the NPD. It did not create the NPD, but it gave the party a chance. It provided, so to speak, the milieu in which the NPD could benefit from popular perceptions.

But, during our recent recession, our social security system worked. Let me give you a small personal example. A year ago in January, I was looking for a secretary. She had to, at least, speak English. Someone came along, we talked, and I said O.K. Then, I asked the university officer how much she would be paid. When I got the figure, she said, "Oh, well, I make this much when I am unemployed" and she walked out. She said, "Why should I do it; I get an unemployment check of 1800 Deutschmarks." The attitude was very interesting. She did not want to be put on a lower secretarial level because if she was unemployed again, she would get less income. All these considerations were in her mind. She walked out and said, "Well, I have to wait a little bit; I'm not starving; I get the same amount of money when I'm not working." I was really flabbergasted, but I could understand her attitude.

The social security system, of course, puts a high demand on society, on its productivity. Perhaps we disregarded the warnings which were put forward in the late 1950's and early 1960's when the system was introduced. I remember, for instance, a very good analysis by an economist; he used a simulation to demonstrate how much various things would go up with this new system. His point was that it would put an enormous demand on society. Our system also creates a certain kind of behavior. Both parties were quite clear during the recent election that this issue would be a major one which would have to be solved after the election. Both parties were very much afraid of losing voter support over this issue. And, it came up immediately

after the election. The present government was really squeezed by it, but any government would have been. This is not a CDU-SPD question, even if it sometimes takes partisan forms. The really substantial question is how to guarantee the sort of social security system we have in Germany in the future. We cannot go back. Our system puts an enormous demand on society, but it also creates enormous expectations of government. There is a segment of the German population that is satisfied so long as the government produces, but wants to change the government whenever this productivity falters. This is a critical aspect of the West German political culture, the output orientation discussed by Almond and Verba. But, the real question for West Germany--and many other West European countries and the United States--is how to meet the rising level of demands with limited resources.

Finally, I have to mention one other developmental problem that has come up in recent years, namely education policy. Since I am employed by a university, some of you might think I am not a disinterested party. But, I do not want to offer a personal opinion on the question of education policy. Rather, I simply want to point out that this is one of the areas in West Germany in which, up to now, neither the federal constitution nor actual political developments have produced the kind of mediating institutions that we have for industrial conflicts. It is not just a question of federalism, that is,that the states are able to make important decisions with reference to education; it is also that we do not have any mediating institutions and the pressure for such institutions is very strong now. The states, especially Baden-Wuerttemberg where I am from, are pushing very hard to save money, and they are squeezing university budgets or trying to rebuild a number of differential institutions in the field of welfare education. Moreover, there is a rising number of students. Contemporary projections indicate that the future West German student population will be larger than ever before. There are many good ideas about how to overcome this problem, which was created in the sixties by very wrong decision making. But, the point is that the federal and state government will have to face it. In the sixties, we warned against not opening the well without controlling the river by

providing some space for the new water coming down. But, the policy to enlarge the number of students going to high school and the university was implemented and now we are not really prepared to deal with its consequences. And, there are other questions involved, for example, with reference to the development of science ard research.

So, I think you can see that education is an area that is fraught with potential problems. Unfortunately, however, we do not have the kind of reasonable decision making structures that we have in other fields that would enable us to deal with these problems. It is not just federalism versus centralism; it has something to do with the absence of a framework for educational policymaking. This is one of the problems which is currently bothering the society, the university people and the politicians, and, in my view, it is a problem which will have an enormous impact in the next 20 or 25 years on the development of the society. In this area, then, the lack of a constitutional-institutional setup prevents the policy makers from taking advantage of the abundant ideas and experiences, inside and outside of Germany, to make meaningful policy decisions.

Coming back to the initial point, if you were to ask me, "How is West Germany," I cannot share the belief that West Germany has lost its "stability." There is a party governmental system which has continuity, and, as I have said, if Schmidt fails, there will be an alternative. This party system has some problems, but they are not essential problems in the sense that we would have to expect a major revolutionary or evolutionary kind of development. And, I cannot even see that this party system is going to be fractionalized again. Moreover, I am still of the opinion that the governmental-constitutional structure of West Germany, as it has developed in recent years, provides ample opportunities for dealing with the most serious political issues, even in the foreign policy area. Nevertheless, we have one field, education, where something must be done on the constitutional side. And, one of the major problems for government--as well as the population--in the future will be how to meet rising demands for governmental output in a time of limited resources and a growth rate which will not be what it was in the sixties or the early seventies.

SOCIAL POLICY IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THE UNITED STATES

by

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In this paper I would like to present some notes that one might conceive of as sketches, perhaps, for an attempt to portray different aspects of social policy in the Federal Republic and the United States. If a donor sponsored a series of murals about contemporary social policy, which might be a bit like the murals in Rockefeller Center, what kinds of themes might we suggest? In that framework, I might suggest as an overall motif that we conceptualize social policies as vehicles with anywhere from two to four major wheels,and perhaps some additional wheels,which help certain population groups move along parts of their life spans a little less effortlessly or a little more efficiently and with a little higher probability that they will reach at least their next way station.

In most of the advanced western countries, social policy vehicles have moved primarily on four similar major wheels. One of these wheels is education policy, another is the wheel of health delivery policy, a third is the wheel of pensions or social security and a fourth one is taxation policy. Furthermore, depending on the size and the quality of the wheels and the size and proportion of the passenger cabins that these wheels make technically feasible, different proportions of the populations in question can be transported with greater or lesser comfort or discomfort. For instance, if the carriage only has a modest size education wheel and a small health wheel, there will be fewer accomodations for the elderly. Some of them will still move along the road, but they will have to do it by walking. If the wheels of the social policy vehicle are of significantly disproportionate size and quality, then even many of those that are carried along will have a kind of discombobulated ride and some may even be jostled out of one of the open doors. Furthermore, the energy that the engineer of the economic system engine that is doing the pulling will need to pull the total cart forward may also have to be greater.

In another tableau, I would spell out some of the differences in the construction of these policy vehicles in different contexts. In the United States, for example, conflict is always built into the construction of social policies because of the greater diversity of jurisdictions. Most of our programs in these areas have traditionally worked through state and local government agencies, over whose personnel the American federal government has less influence generally than does the German federal government. For instance, the two dozen largest federally funded income support programs were, until the recent reorganization, under the jurisdiction of eleven different federal agencies and ten House and nine Senate congressional committees; in addition, they involved numerous state and local administrative authorities. In Germany, there are also federal divisions of power and some social policies, like education and health, are not completely under federal jurisdiction. Thus, there are conflicts there as well. However, I would not think they are as extensive or as continuous in the policy making process as is usually the case in America. Furthermore, in periods of especial economic stringency, German subnational governments have been more willing to cede, defacto, some of their policy making powers to higher authority. In 1931, important developments in the health sector occurred at a time of economic and political emergency.

Turning, then, to the more specific areas we want to discuss, let us look, first, at social security policy. I will forego the temptation to go back to Bismarck; he has appeared in plenty of other scenarios. Rather, I'd like to focus on some very recent developments. One of the differences in regard to social security policy in the United States and West Germany is that in the 1950's, as well as earlier, the major German political parties were more cooperative in their attitudes toward the development of a social security policy than was the case much of the time in the U.S. In the postwar period, the major parties in Germany were zeroed in on very similar target groups, particularly the elderly, and the outbidding they engaged in with reference to enlarging the titlement under the pension programs and other income maintenance programs was, I think, in relative

contrast to the U.S., where into the 1940's and 1950's Republican majorities--or at least large Republican minorities--in the U.S. Congress were voting against extensions of the American social security programs as they were carried through at that time. So, we have to give the German politicians a certain credit for extending these social "goodies" while avoiding the kind of whiplash reaction that we find most typically in Denmark where, because of the high taxes they had to pay for these kinds of things, certain groups engaged in the unusual action of helping a new rebel party gain a very quick prominence on the scene. In Germany, until very recently, the fellows who served as social ministers in the cabinets were among the most favored and were the ones who helped their parties the most during election campaigns. As recently as 1972, for instance, Emke judged his colleague Ahrendt, the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, the most successful minister in the government. And another Social Democrat in that Brandt cabinet said that what the government had done in extending many of these programs constituted something like a golden era and that there had been no comparable period in the 20th century. It's quite striking to remember this picture of five years ago and to zero in on what has happened in the same sphere in the past few months.

As many of you will know, the first problem that Helmut Schmidt ran into after the election occurred when he and his colleagues in the cabinet decided that they would postpone some of their cash flow problems by delaying the increases in pension payments that they had promised during the election campaign by six months. There was an immediate flash-fire protest, especially from within the SPD itself, and this led to the start of the campaign which pulled Schmidt down from his position of high self-confidence through vehicles such as a cover in Der Spiegel in which the magazine put into Helmut's mouth the promise he had made during the election that the Social Democrats would stick to their promises to increase pension rates on time. This reaction forced Schmidt and the government to recant and to withdraw their plan and this led to a series of events which

seem to be rather unique, perhaps, in normal postwar German politics. First of all, Ahrendt resigned as head of the ministry. Secondly, I think five of the top six bureaucrats in that ministry were kicked out and completely replaced, something which is, to my knowledge, kind of a new high in personnel changes at the top of a ministry resulting from a policy problem. This has led to a search for other policy alternatives including health, social security and other aspects of social policy which is still going on and which has not been solved yet. And because of this situation, one of the leaders of the CDU, Biedenkopf, was able to accuse the bureaucracy and the government of not being able to assess the consequences of their own corrective measures.

Now, why did the Schmidt government get into this kind of problem? When we get into this, the similarities between the United States and Germany become more apparent because many of the reasons are that the Germans adopted changes in their pension system which were later adopted by the U.S., one of them being the semi-automatic increases in pension payments which was adopted in Germany in 1957 and in this country four or five years ago. The way it has operated in Germany is that in the last seven or eight years the rate of increase in the pension payments has been greater than the rate of increase in workers' incomes, something like 103 percent for the former and 80 percent for the latter. Curiously, in the United States this shift to semi-automatic pension increases four or five years ago was accomplished without any partisan fight at all and with hardly any public discussion. Nevertheless, it has led to somewhat similar problems for American pension funds which, of course, are structured much differently than the German ones. What makes the German situation a bit more acute is that if the recent input and output payment trend should continue, the projections are that the funds will, theoretically, be depleted in a few years. What makes the German situation a little more complicated is that the Germans recently adopted still other options, particularly the one which gives people at the age of 63 the possibility of premature retirement. If

they take this option, they will get somewhat lower pensions per year, but their total pension payments over a likely lifetime would be something like 13 percent more than they would have gotten under the old system when they retired at 65 or older. Apparently, something like 80 percent of the 63 year old men have decided for this option, a surprising figure to me.

So, the problem currently being dealt with by the ministry is whether to take the political risk of making the funds more viable by increasing the already very high contributions paid by both workers and employers--I think it is now something like nine percent by each side--or relying on an upswing in the economy to once again fill these funds at a healthier rate. The government seems to be relying on the optimistic estimate that the funds could stay viable if salaries continued to rise annually by about nine percent and if, at most, only 1.9 percent of those willing to work are unemployed. As we know, the situation at the moment is not this positive.

Turning now to the health policy area, the recent German scene offers some examples of relatively dramatic action, as these things go in the social policy area. The political dynamics of health policy in Germany are complex, and the perceptions of how Germany and the United States are positioned is, perhaps, misperceived by a lot of people. Even relatively informed people seem to believe that the German health system is a socialized system--or something close to this--because it is largely a publicly financed and mandated program. But, I would say that the political dynamics of health policy in Germany have remained, in many ways, remarkably similar to the American ones, more similar, perhaps, than in most other European countries. And, this is true even though the actual ownership and payment mechanisms are sharply different. In particular, the ability of the providers, especially the physicians, to develop and maintain veto positions on new policy initiatives have, I think, been quite similar in the American and German systems over the past 30 or 40 years. The German physicians, in different ways than American doctors but with similar effects, have been able to link and develop very effective professional monopolies which have allowed

them very strong bargaining positions in their negotiations with the sickness funds which finance most of the outpatient treatment and with the governments which finance most of the hospital facilities. The difference in the German case has been that the physicians have been able to implement their monopolies through a predominantly publicly financed--or in the case of the sickness funds, semi-publicly financed--system. Moreover, in Germany as in the United States, many of the physician and hospital interests have been able to operate within the semi-public sphere to maintain and strengthen their monopoly position and neither the CDU governments of the 1950's nor the socialist governments of the 1960's and 1970's have been able to make any significant progress with this situation.

The intriguing thing is the type of mobilization tactics the German doctors' associations have been using to counter government initiatives. These very robust techniques are almost unique in the world, particularly since the AMA, which once used them to successfully intimidate legislators and bureaucrats, modified its tone somewhat after Medicaid and Medicare were imposed over its bitter resistance in the mid 1960's. But, in Germany the physicians' associations have continued this very robust aggressive defensive position and this is where the interesting development has occurred.

As some of you may have noticed, the new minister, Ehrenberg, who succeeded Ahrendt, has finally felt forced in the past few months to tackle a problem which is dogging almost all western countries which do not have central national control in the health sector--as perhaps only Britain effectively has--namely the problem of trying to contain the constantly spiraling cost of health services in many, almost all, subsectors. We know that this is one of the key problems in this country and the bureaucrats in HEW are presently working feverishly to develop techniques of cost control. Insofar as the attempt is made to impose absolute limits on both the public and private health sectors in this country, these techniques are going to be unique, for they are different from anything I know of that is being tried or devised for any other sector. In Germany, however, Ehrenberg was a little

bit ahead of our initiatives because he developed a plan for setting something like absolute limits on the total global amount that health expenditures could rise from year to year and he proposed to put into law that the rise in this sector of total expenditures had to be related somewhat to certain other figures like increases in the GNP.

But while this bill was still in the drafting stage, the German doctors followed their model of robust mobilization by staging a one day strike in the Hannover region to once again resist this bureaucratic infringement on what they regarded as the rights of themselves and their patients. The interesting thing is that the doctors did not succeed in gaining their political ends. No only, however, did they not succeed in getting much public sympathy, most of the political and other groups on the non-socialist side did not even join them. Rather, they condemned them. This reaction was perhaps typified by an editorial that was carried in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung which was to me a rather scathing attack on the mobilization tactics of the medical association. It appeared about a month ago and the lead article pointed out that almost no one had lifted a finger to support the doctors' noisy campaign against the proposal being put forward by the ministry; and, in tones very unusual for the FAZ, it called on the doctors to be ashamed of themselves. The editorial culminated by noting that seldom had any professional group stood so isolated from the rest of public opinion as the doctors stood in this effort last month.

So, it may be that a new period of attempts to more successfully guide health policies and to reform the structures of health delivery has begun in Germany. As in the United States, the German reformers will be primarily concerned with the immediate case, namely with stopping the cost spiral or dampening the cost spiral which has the effect of claiming funds which could go to other social policy areas like education, where the bureaucrats know more about how to stop a cost explosion than they do in many areas of the health sector. The question in the German case, and also in the American case to come, is the extent to which bureaucratic reformers

will be able to link and parlay these cost control techniques into ways that will recast the structure of health delivery. In the German case, part of the problem is to weaken the monopoly position of the Kassenaerzte, the general practioners, by reducing the legal monopoly on outpatient care which they have enjoyed for a number of decades and by creating greater competition between the general practitioners and the outpatient clinics of hospitals which could keep costs down and, perhaps, improve the quality of care as well.

In both the United States and West Germany, education has been organized more separately than the other social policy areas. This tendency has been, perhaps, more pronounced in Germany where the area of Bildung, higher education, has seemed, conceptually, so far removed from concerns like health and social security that both buresucratically and politically, it has been handled more separately. But, the separateness of education in Germany is one of the things that may have led to the fact that the Germans have been slower than other European countries in reforming their educational system. The Germans were late-comers on the European scene--and, of course, much later than the U.S.--in terms of trying to devise ways of turning secondary and especially higher education into a mass institution. They tried to benefit from this lateness by generating very high powered educational planning techniques, educational planning goals and educational planning machinery. These efforts of roughly the last eight to ten years, however, have met with only modest success and some of them have been dismantled.

Consequently, most observers would say that although the educational scenery has changed a good deal, particularly at the university level, the specifications of how to fit the education wheel and the educational system into the rest of German social policy are far from ideal and possibly in a very serious state. I tend to feel that the area of education is the most problematic one in contemporary Germany. Perhaps this is because in the U.S., under our highly decentralized structure, more things are feasible with lesser decision making costs. For instance, small colleges can go

out of existence without any public body necessarily having to make a decision. The overall future problems in education in the U.S. may be more manageable than in Germany where this general concept of entitlements that I have mentioned before may be causing a problem. The Germans have a centuries old tradition, which the United States largely lacks, that people who have leaving credentials from a certain level of training, Gymnasium, university and so on, are entitled to a position--or are close to being entitled to a position--in the public brueaucracy because they have earned that degree. In the United States, defacto, the expectation of an automatic job is maintained by a few favorite groups, especially the physicians, where supply has always been short of demand. But at most times and in most branches of higher education, even the more qualified, that is, those with high grades, do not have an expectation of a job with the government, or, for that matter, an expectation of a job with anyone, after graduation.

Now, what the German and other European education planners have to cope with is the problem of how they can continue to increase the number of students attending a university at a time when, given the present parameters of economic and public sector growth, they definitely cannot expect to have the additional numbers of new positions in the various categories that the increased number of university graduates will necessitate. This will be a particular problem over the next several years because the size of the cohorts graduating from the various levels of education will continue to increase. It should begin to decrease about 1983. The officials in the education ministry in Bonn and elsewhere say they will simply have to persuade young people that they must drop this idea of entitlement, but implementing this in a country where generations of people have become accustomed to this kind of expectation is likely to generate some very significant problems.

So, I think I do see serious problems, particularly in the current, and I guess continuing, period of retrenchment in various German public sectors. I can also see the pressure that is applied by the oversupply of people with educational credentials having consequences for the other wheels of the

social policy vehicle. In the U.S. we will obviously be facing similar problems, but because of the decentralized, more privatized nature of many of our programs, our problems may be more disguised over the medium run.

UNITED STATES-WEST GERMAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS: A REVIEW OF POSTWAR TRENDS AND SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE*

by

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Security is the bedrock of German-American relations. This is a trivial statement but an important one. By some definitions, "security" is the fundamental reason for the whole set of postwar arrangements that have grown up linking the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. In this paper, I want to explore what "security" means or has meant in those relations; look at the changing definition that has been accorded "security" through the postwar period; and, especially, examine changes in the priority given to the more strictly military aspects of security in relation to other issue areas, particularly economic affairs.

I will break the postwar period down into several subperiods. This is obviously artificial. Any changes have been more evolutionary than abrupt alterations from one discrete period to the next. But I think it is useful as a presentational device to break the postwar period into several subperiods, trying to get some sense of what security meant in each and of how the definition of security changed within and between these subperiods. I shall look first at the period from the early postwar era to the early 1960's, then at the second period from the 1960's, roughly, to the last several years, and finally I shall briefly examine the present and speculate a bit about the future.

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*At the time the author presented this paper he was a member of the National Security Council. The paper is an edited version of the author's oral presentation. It contains personal observations to an academic audience and has no official standing, no bearing one way or another on government policy.

Early Postwar to Early 1960's

In this period, security, defined very broadly, was the imperative. There was no separation of the economic aspects of security from the military aspects. In fact, in this period, economic recovery was paramount. The symbol of that paramountcy was, of course, the Marshall Plan--a significant transfer of American resources from the United States to Germany and the rest of Europe in an effort to avert what was seen as an impending collapse of European economies and societies. During this period, there was little conflict or perceived conflict between U.S. economic and military objectives. Quite the contrary, the United States perceived that both its more narrow military interests and its broader economic stakes were advanced by the Marshall Plan.

Once the immediate recovery of the European economies was under way and the Cold War intensified, the emphasis shifted from the general task of rebuilding European economies to constructing a more narrow military security relationship. The obvious bench marks in that process were the formation of NATO in the early 1950's and German rearmament in the latter half of that decade. It is important to note, however, that even with this shift in emphasis from broad economic relations to a somewhat narrower security relationship, there was still no perceived conflict between United States and German interests, economic or military, nor was there a perceived conflict between the economic and more narrowly defined military interests of the United States. In fact, to give one example, the substantial balance-of-payments outflow that was occasioned by both the Marshall Plan and the stationing of large numbers of American troops in Europe--primarily in Germany--was perceived as useful. The balance-of-payments outflow was seen not as a harmful development, but as a beneficial one. In those days there was a global dollar shortage, not the dollar glut of later years. The large United States balance-of-payment deficits, occasioned by both the military and economic aspects of U.S.-European relations, provided liquidity which was useful in promoting the economic recovery of the various European countries. It also built the basis for international monetary structures.

Once the emphasis had shifted toward constructing more narrowly defined military security relations, there was little worry, either in the United States or Europe, about the effect of Germany's military buildup on the general situation in Western Europe. There were several reasons for this. One was that the Cold War was an overriding concern. It diminished whatever edginess there might otherwise have been about German rearmament. In addition, the existence of the Alliance provided a means of surrounding the German military buildup with cooperative alliance structures. That theme obviously functioned below the surface of alliance relations, but perhaps not very far below. It was an important strain.

Early 1960's to Early 1970's

In this period, the situation changed. The change was gradual, but again it may be useful to focus somewhat artificially on a separate period and examine the changes both in the definition accorded security and in the priority given the more narrowly defined military aspects of security during that period.

First, it is obvious that the strictly military aspects of the U.S.-German security relationship changed during the second period. There were several obvious reasons for this. The first was the emergence of something like strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Parity obviously grew up and came to be recognized over a long period of time, but its effects began to be felt in the mid-1960's. At the same time, the sense of military threat from the East diminished. It remained a much more real threat in Germany than in the rest of Europe and in the United States, but even in Germany there was some change.

To illustrate this, it is worth discussing the doctrine of flexible response which was finally adopted by NATO in 1967 after having been American policy, defacto, for the previous half decade. Flexible response was the doctrine that suggested that NATO ought to be prepared to counteract the Warsaw Pact at every level: at the conventional level, at the theatre

nuclear level and at the strategic nuclear level. It was the idea that NATO ought to have flexible enough forces to meet a variety of military threats from the Warsaw Pact and not be forced to resort to nuclear weapons in a very short time after the advent of hostilities. Yet, this change and how long it took for it to be adopted as NATO strategy suggest what was going on in the more narrow military element of the security relationship between the United States and Germany. For instance, Europeans, and especially Germans, found the change of strategy away from the massive retaliation of the Dulles period unsettling to the extent that it signaled that it might be possible to fight a conventional war in Europe without resort to nuclear weapons. That accounts in large measure for how long it took the alliance to adopt flexible response as its strategy. Obviously, any conventional war fought in Europe would have been fought on German soil. Therefore, Germany, in particular, but also the rest of the Europeans in varying measures, wanted nothing of it. What was important--especially to Germans--and continues to be important, is deterrence, not defense. Deterrence to Germans and other Europeans had, and continues to have, primarily a nuclear meaning.

That began in this period of the 1960's to raise a dilemma. If one accepted that there was something approaching strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union and if one worried, at least if one were European, that the United States in particular but the Alliance in general was beginning to see a diminished military threat from the East, then how could Germans and other Europeans be sure that the United States would actually use nuclear weapons in a serious conflict? How could Germans and Europeans be sure that the United States would risk its own cities in an era of strategic parity on behalf of Europe's defense? That dilemma, which really became obvious in the period of the 1960's, is still with us. Europeans, and especially Germans, are extremely edgy about any movement away from reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. Nevertheless, there are still doubts about whether or not those weapons would actually be used.

The second change that occurred during this period was that the possibility of tension between U.S. military interests and American economic interests in its alliance with Germany and its other European allies began to be perceived. Perhaps the symbol of this possibility of conflict of U.S. objectives was the so-called "offset" negotiations that began in the early 1960's. In the early postwar period, as mentioned above, the United States was happy enough to run the balance-of-payments deficits that were part of stationing 200-250,000 American soldiers in Germany. Running those deficits was perceived to be economically costless and militarily useful. But that perception changed in the early 1960's. The United States began to request that Germany provide some financial assistance, some "offset", to the balance-of-payments deficits occasioned by stationing American troops in Germany. The offset negotiations began even though American troops were presumably stationed in Germany out of a shared security interest. That development suggests that security was given a more narrow definition, a more military definition. That is, security was being equated more with military security than with some sense of broad shared economic and military security. No longer was it out of the question to link the military aspects of this relationship to economic interests. No longer did making that sort of linkage between economic and military aspects appear to threaten some broad definition of security.

This observation is really a manifestation of a notion that has become fashionable in the last few years. That is, that the hierarchy of issues, particularly in U.S.-European relations, has changed. Earlier there was a sense that security in the military sense was far and away the prime interest in those relations, and that all the rest, including economics, was very far behind. Over the last few years, however, it has been observed more and more often that economic interests in the United States and in Europe are more salient and, to a certain extent, the military aspects of security are less salient. The context of that change is obviously the completion of the German and European economic recoveries of the 1950's and 1960's and the

formation of the Common Market. In that sense, the change is merely a sign that previous policies were successful. The policies designed to foster economic recovery--both American and European policies--succeeded beyond all expectations.

Yet, there have been more and more instances in which specific U.S. economic interests have been perceived to conflict with European economic interests, or with more narrowly defined military security interests. This has increased over the decade between the early 1960's and the early 1970's. In the case of offset it was obvious, but it also ran through other dealings between the U.S. and Germany in a less explicit way. One example might be some of the U.S. dealings with Germany with respect to agriculture. These could be interpreted as an example of the United States using its dominant military security relationship with West Germany for purposes of trying, in subtle ways, to induce the Germans to make some break in the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy. The goal was to advance U.S. economic interests, or at least reduce what was perceived in the United States as the discrimination inherent in the Common Agricultural Policy.

At the same time in this period, the problem of German prominence in alliance structures increased. Germany obviously began to bulk very large, both economically within the Common Market and military within NATO. In part, the problem arose because other national military contributions to NATO did not grow at the same rate as the German; but, the problem also occurred because the German military buildup proceeded very rapidly. There was, as a consequence, a search for new kinds of cooperative endeavors that would somehow submerge or surround the German prominence and thus permit German aspirations to be fulfilled within a cooperative security framework. An example of this search was the famous--now infamous--Multi-Lateral Force (MLF). The proposal, first made in the early 1960's, was for a fleet of NATO surface ships with nuclear weapons. The ships were to be manned by sailors of different NATO countries, with the United States retaining control over the firing of nuclear weapons aboard the ships. The MLF was an

immediate response to a rather specific issue--the perception that by somehow being denied access, in any form, to nuclear weapons within the alliance, Germany was being accorded a second class status. Therefore, there ought to be some cooperative endeavor which would permit Germany's aspirations to be fulfilled in a way that would be unsettling to neither the Soviet Union nor, perhaps, to other NATO allies. It also seems to be that the MLF was more generally a response to a perceived set of German needs which ran beyond this more narrow security question, the question of access to nuclear weapons. In the actual case of the MLF, those perceptions were wide of the mark; in fact, the entire episode can be seen as a U.S. response to German needs which did not exist, for, in fact, the MLF would have caused more trouble in German politics than it would have solved.

But, at the same time, the episode is indicative of the concerns of the time. There were several tendencies in the definition of security in the second period. One was a "narrowing"--that is, security was given a more narrow military definition. The narrow military threat was becoming less salient for most of the alliance; it remained more salient for Germany but still less salient than in the previous period. There was obviously a certain amount of tension inherent in the West German effort to, on the one hand, improve relations with its eastern neighbors, and, on the other, accept as very real the possibility that those eastern neighbors might attack it militarily. So, even in Germany the more narrow military aspect of the security threat began to become somewhat attenuated over time.

There was a third change in this period which was particularly visible toward the end of it. If the strictly military aspect of security was becoming narrower, some non-military issues were coming to have security implications. With the growth of the European economies, particularly the German economy, there was the possibility of perceived economic conflict between the United States and German or European economies. There was also a chance that security, if given a broad definition, would be defined differently by Germans than by Americans in

specific instances. The oil crisis of 1973 is an example. European economies were obviously dependent on Arab oil to a much greater extent than was the American. Hence, some of the initial American strategies--which really called for a kind of confrontation with the Arab oil producing states in the hope that the solidarity of OPEC could be broken--were bound to be perceived very differently by Europeans than they were by Americans. Such strategies had for Germans and for other Europeans a high degree of risk of failure that could have meant the continuation or the increase in the Arab blockade. That, in turn, would have had a quite direct security implication for European economies which just was not the case for the United States.

In summary, by the early 1970's a certain evolution in the concept of security in U.S.-West German relations and of the priority accorded more narrowly defined military aspects of security vis-a-vis other issue areas, particularly economics, had occurred. It seems to me there were several aspects to this evolution. The strictly military aspects of security began to seem less and less real, though still quite real for Germans. There remained the unresolved dilemma about strategy and about the use of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, there was more possibility of conflict between military issues and economic ones or between U.S. and German non-military interests, particularly economic interests. There was more likelihood that the military aspects of security--which earlier had been treated almost as sacrosanct--would be linked to economic issues. Former Secretary Kissinger, then a presidential advisor, seemed to threaten Europeans and Germans in 1973 in his famous "Year of Europe" speech when he suggested that economic, military and political issues in U.S.-European relations were linked not because the United States had any tactical purpose in doing so, but merely because they were linked in fact. That aroused, understandably I think, the fear in Europe that the United States would to a much greater extent than before use an issue area in which it was strong--that is, the military security relationship--to secure an advantage in an area where it perceived

itself to be weak--that is, economics. Of course, in the United States there was a perception that was, in a sense, just the other side of the coin. It was thought that in some sense United States troops in Europe were more valuable to Europeans than to Americans; therefore, even though there was a common security interest, Europeans ought to be prepared somehow to pay something or do something more to insure the continued presence of these troops.

A third aspect of this evolution was the possibility that new kinds of threats or new issues would emerge that would touch "security" broadly defined. The obvious example was oil, where the kinds of threats, the kinds of risks and the degrees of importance involved in the issue were just different--much different--for Europe than for the United States. The issue was bound to be perceived differently by Germans or Europeans than by Americans.

Contemporary Conditions and Speculations About the Future of Security in U.S.-West German Relations

What, then, does all this imply for the present and future definition and place of security in U.S.-German relations? What does it imply for the relationship between the military aspects of the security relationship and the other elements of the broader relationship between the United States and Germany.

In one sense, the worst European fears of 1973--that the United States' perception of the military threat from the East would continue to decline rapidly and at the same time that there would be many more episodes of rather conscious linkage between the military relationship and the economic relationship--have not been borne out during the last several years. The reasons are not hard to find. The most obvious is the increased anxiety in the United States, only a little less than in Germany and Europe, about Soviet intentions. There has been, as we know, a considerable expansion and modernization of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. That expansion and modernization is troubling to many people in the West. It is not easily explained in any customary way. More recently, the Soviet

intervention in Angola and elsewhere in Africa has seemed to many people to suggest a break with some of the implicit conceptions of detente. Somehow the relationship has seemed not to be proceeding as it had been expected to in the West; the kinds of constraints many had expected the Soviet Union to observe were not in fact operating. Some of these perceptions have been overdrawn, but they certainly have contributed to this sense of anxiety about Soviet intentions.

Even though they were very far from the central front, such developments have had their impact on perceptions of Europeans, Germans and Americans about the situation in Central Europe. There have been, for example, no attempts in the last several years like those that Senator Mansfield once made to force the United States to withdraw substantial numbers of forces from Europe, particularly Germany. It seems to me that this sense of anxiety has been paralleled in Germany as well. Ostpolitik is regarded as a success, but seems to be at an impasse. And, I think there is a feeling in Germany that it has not fulfilled some of the more elaborate expectations some people had for it: there have been concrete improvements in relations between the East and the West, particularly between East and West Germany, but there has been much less of a change in the East's attitudes toward the West than many had expected. So, in one sense, the more strictly military aspects of security--the immediate threat and need for a military response--are more real now than five years ago, or are at least perceived as much more real. To that extent, the definition of security is more shared between Germans, and other Europeans, and Americans than was the case five years ago.

A second, though less important, reason why the worst fears of 1972 and 1973 were not borne out are the changes in the international economic system that have ensued since the first part of the 1970's. They may have removed some of the divisive economic issues between the United States and Europe, and, to that extent, reduced the probability that specific kinds of divisive economic issues between the allies will touch the military

aspects of the relationship. As one example, in 1971 the Western countries began the practice of "floating"--that is, using non-fixed exchange rates for their various currencies. That change meant that the balance-of-payments deficits which had formerly been such an issue in U.S. relations with Germany generated less political heat in the United States than was the case before. In theory, at least, the United States was permitted to make its decisions about military forces and where those forces were to be stationed as it chose on military grounds with changes in the value of the dollar taking care of any of the balance-of-payments impact resulting from choices that were made.*

At the same time, many of the old issues connected with the definition of security in U.S.-German relations are still alive, or at least latent just below the surface. Many of the old dilemmas are likely to recur in new forms, and there are new suggestions of change in the role of security in U.S.-German relations. While some of the changes in international financial arrangements may have removed the political heat surrounding some military issues, the larger--and older--question of the economic effects of NATO military arrangements is still with us. These aspects are still an issue between the United States and Europe, especially Germany, and could easily become more so with the concern over the fall of the dollar. There is, for instance, the continuing controversy over weapons standardization--trying to provide NATO with a set of weapons that will have some relation to one another that will not be merely what each nation produces and buys for its own armed forces. Accompanying this has been the debate over the so-called "two-way street"--the suggestion that the United States ought

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*This happy judgment, made from the vantage point of early 1977, obviously looks somewhat different in late 1978 when the fall of the dollar is the issue in U.S.-European relations. Still, the existing monetary order, shaky as it is, may continue to make it less likely that specific linkages across economic and military aspects will arise.

to act to reduce the disparity between the amount of arms European NATO allies purchase in the United States and those that the United States purchases in Europe. The Europeans, and Germans in particular, feel, with some justification, that when the United States has talked in recent years of standardizing weapons, what it has really meant is that Europeans should buy American weapons. Over the last ten years the flow has been about ten to one: something like eight billion dollars in European purchases in the United States compared to about 700 million dollars of American purchases in Europe. Germans, and other Europeans with smaller armies and smaller defense budgets, need to export weapons in a way that the United States does not. They are concerned about the health of their own defense industries, about their own capabilities to continue producing sophisticated weapons, and they feel it is important to maintain the health of these industries, not necessarily because they are desirable, but because they are in many instances at the technological edge of their broader industrial base.

These controversies over weapon standardizations and the "two-way street" will continue to be with us. They are currently at play in the U.S.-German difficulties about both AWACS, the fleet of electronically equipped airplanes to be used in early warning of an eastern attack, and in the controversy over joint tank development programs. There is, as well, the continuation of the old dilemma about NATO strategy and, in particular, about the role of nuclear weapons. That, too, is still with us and is likely to continue to be important in the future role of security in U.S.-German relations, though it may take rather different forms than it has taken in the recent past. For instance, there has been a separation between the strategic arms limitation talks, SALT, which have been a U.S.-Soviet venture, and the effort to reduce conventional arms in Europe, that is the MBFR discussions going on in Vienna. But, I think what we are finding is that certain kinds of new weapons and the possibilities of their use make it increasingly difficult to separate these two sets of negotiations.

One obvious example is the cruise missile of which so much has been written and discussed in recent years. Depending on their range, these missiles could be considered either a strategic weapon or a tactical one, and they could be fitted either with a nuclear warhead or with a non-nuclear warhead. In the SALT talks, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have had great difficulty in coming to an agreement about what to do with these weapons. But, issues like cruise missiles have a bearing on U.S. relations with its allies. Since they could be either nuclear weapons or conventional ones and since they may be, for many conventional purposes, a very useful weapon, Europeans and Germans have been edgy about anything the United States might do in the SALT negotiations which would diminish the possibilities Europeans and Germans might have to employ cruise missiles. On the other hand, it seems almost out of the question to think of merging the SALT and MBFR discussions to try to handle both problems simultaneously. That would not only be an impossible negotiation, but it would, in another sense, open directly the question of the role of nuclear weapons in NATO, raising that old issue and old dilemma in a much more extreme form.

Finally, it seems to me there are further possibilities for new issues, new issues that will come to have a security connotation, and which may be perceived rather differently by Americans and Germans or other Europeans. The question of oil was mentioned earlier. The current German-American differences over the question of non-proliferation is another kind of example. It is clear that Germans and Americans share a determination that nuclear weapons not be spread around the world because it would be a disaster for all concerned. They share the general goal of non-proliferation. At the same time, the two countries come to that general goal from very different perspectives, which suggests that the security content of that issue is perceived rather differently by the two countries. For the United States, the technology of reprocessing spent fuel from reactors is coming to be seen not only as economically not a good deal, but more important, it is seen as too sensitive a technology

to employ at all. Reprocessing produces plutonium and plutonium can be used to make bombs. In the United States, there is a growing perception that we ought to search for alternative technologies which do not involve weapons-grade materials like plutonium, even if there is some economic cost involved. The U.S. has decided that, for its part, it will not invest further in reprocessing technology explicitly because of the international consequences of doing so.

On the other hand, the Germans come to the issue with a quite different perspective. Not only are they much more dependent on imported energy supplies in general, now mostly Arab oil, they also have very little natural uranium, the element which is required to fuel the current light water reactors that do not involve access to plutonium or reprocessing. Not having supplies of natural uranium themselves, the Germans obviously fear that they will merely exchange one kind of dependence on imports--dependence on imported oil--for another sort of dependence--dependence on imported uranium. And so, for them, the technology of reprocessing is bound to have a quite different cast to it. To the United States it might look like the technology is so risky on proliferation grounds that it ought not to be pursued at all, while to the Germans, it may look as though on the grounds of "security", broadly conceived, it at least ought to be considered. These kinds of issues, and, of course, German-American differences, may be more frequent and more acute in the future.

DISCUSSION

Presiding: Dr. Alfred Diamant, Department of Political Science, University of Indiana

Discussants: Dr. Kendall L. Baker, Department of Political Science, University of Wyoming; Dr. Werner Feld, Department of Political Science, University of New Orleans; Dr. Arnold Heidenheimer, Department of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis; Dr. George Romoser, Department of Political Science, University of New Hampshire; Dr. Rudolf Wildenmann, Mannheim University

Baker: Both panelists have covered a great deal of material and presented some very interesting perspectives on developments in Germany in the postwar period. Professor Wildenmann ended his comments with some thoughts about whether Germany has lost its "stability" and earlier in his talk, he spoke at some length about the party system and the existence of alternative governments. What I would like to do is make some brief comments about the question of stability from another perspective, namely from the point of view of political culture, and then expand a bit on some of the comments Professor Wildenmann made about voting behavior and other factors.

One of the remarks Professor Wildenmann made at the conclusion of his talk had to do with the output orientation of the Germans, something Almond and Verba emphasized years ago in their cross-national survey. This has become the traditional or accepted, if you will, way of explaining what goes on in Germany from the voter's perspective, or from the point of view of the individual. Recently, I have had the opportunity to work with a rather extensive set of longitudinal data which extends from 1953 to 1972. These data, of course, come, in part, from Rudolf Wildenmann and Max Kaase at the University of Mannheim, and, in part, from Erwin Scheuch at the University of Cologne. They are not the Allensbach data which many of you will be familiar with through the work of Boynton and Lowenberg and Conradt. Nevertheless, the kinds of conclusions we have drawn are very similar. And, one of the things that is interesting in this regard is the

question of output orientation. What we have found is that this kind of thing, while it continues to exist, has declined in the postwar period. What we seem to find is something which is a little more akin to what has been called diffuse support--a general attachment to the system which is not dependent on continual economic satisfaction. I do not mean, in any sense, to downgrade the notion of economic satisfaction; both of our speakers have mentioned this and it is clearly important in Germany, as it is in the United States. But, I think it is important to recognize that, if we look at it from a longitudinal perspective, the so-called output orientation of Germans--this attachment to the political system which is based almost exclusively on economic performance and satisfaction--has changed in the postwar period. Now there is some general attachment to the system, and from the point of view of the stability argument, I think this is important to emphasize. Certainly, it is important from the point of view of the postwar development of the German political culture.

In our research we have discovered several other examples of change which are connected to this general topic and I would like to mention a few of them. Not only does there seem to have been an increase in what we can call generalized system support, there has also been an increase in the frequency and pervasiveness of several values and attitudes that are presumably necessary for democratic government. For example, if one compares the frequency distribution for the political efficacy items in the 1972 Mannheim study with the distribution for these same items in the Almond and Verba study of 1959, one will see that the sense of political efficacy has increased significantly in the 13 year period covered by these two studies. If one looks at political involvement, which is something the German studies have not examined as extensively as, perhaps, one would like, one finds the same thing. One of the things I find particularly interesting in this regard is connected to the media session that we had on Wednesday. One of the commentators talked about interpersonal interaction in postwar Germany and another discussed Buergerinitiativen. Our data tend

to substantiate that there has indeed been an increase in the German context in this kind of interpersonal political involvement. This, of course, is something relatively new for Germany and I think it is quite interesting.

In all of our research one factor which seems to be particularly important in understanding the changes I have described is generation. Since a number of youth studies have demonstrated that the political attitudes of young Germans are probably quite different from those of older Germans, this is probably not too surprising. Nevertheless, it does come out rather strongly in the data. There do seem to be quite substantial differences between the various generations, particularly between the two postwar generations and the National Socialist, Weimar and Wilhelmian generations, with reference to many of the kinds of things I have discussed. If one looks at the extent to which respondents discuss politics interpersonally, this cleavage comes out quite strongly, and the same is true for political efficacy and political involvement, though there are some interesting nuances and variations.

What I am suggesting here is that there has been an important change in the political culture of West Germany in the postwar period and I think this tends to support the stability argument that Professor Wildenmann has made about the party system and the structural aspects of the political system. In a sense, all of this relates to a point which he made, with which I agree as long as it is not pushed too far, namely that the value of politics in Germany is relatively low. I think this is true. But again, from a longitudinal perspective, I think one has to recognize that politics seems to be more salient in contemporary Germany than it has been in the past. Certainly modern Germany is not a Platonic democracy; moreover, the Federal Republic does not have the town meeting democracy that we are apparently evolving in this country with our new president. Nevertheless, the salience of politics has increased in the German context, at least if we examine it from the point of view of the kind of individualized indicators I have discussed.

Finally, I would like to make some comments about voting behavior in postwar Germany. The remark was made, and I think it is correct, that Germans, like Americans and most other people, vote, to some extent, in accordance with their pocketbook. I do not think this really can be disputed. Economic conditions have been repeatedly demonstrated to have an effect on voting behavior; this is obviously connected to the output orientation I discussed earlier. Yet, one of the most fascinating characteristics of German voting behavior in the postwar period has been the decline in the power of the traditional socio-economic predictors. In the longitudinal analysis I have been involved in we have examined the relationship between socio-economic variables, like education, income and so on, and voting behavior and there is a marvelous curve in these data which shows that each of these predictors has declined rather substantially since 1953. This does not mean they do not continue to play a role in voting behavior, but it does mean they are probably not as important as they once were. In our research we developed some indexes of class voting and we found, in a sense through trial and error, that if we divided the middle class into the "old" and the "new" middle class, distinguishing between selbstaendige occupations and Beamte and Angestellte, the class voting indexes for the new middle class are much smaller in the present period than they have been in the past.

These findings raise, of course, the very interesting question of what has replaced socio-economic variables in postwar German voting behavior. In other words, if socio-economic variables are not providing the cues for voting behavior that they provided in the past, then what is influencing the voter's choice? In this context, I found it interesting that Professor Wildenmann pointed out that there was some kind of identification with the German parties, even though it may well not be the kind of identification we find in this country. Our data tend to confirm this. There does seem to be some kind of connection between partisanship and voting behavior. Most of the American studies indicate that party

identification has been declining in this country during the past decade or so. In Germany, in contrast, there seems to have been something of an increase in party identification, and this has occurred at precisely the same time that socio-economic factors have been declining as determinants of voting behavior. This does not mean, however, that party identification, alone, determines voting behavior in contemporary Germany. Our analysis indicates that issue orientation is important as well. We found some indication in our data of the development of a post-materialist value cluster in Germany. Particularly common among young people who have experienced only the postwar period, this factor seems to be quite important in determining party choice and voting behavior.

To summarize quickly, I think the data we have examined tend to suggest that part of the explanation for the structural stability Professor Wildenmann has emphasized can be found in the changes in the German political culture which have occurred in the postwar period.

Romoser: Well, I am at somewhat of a loss as to how to define the general area in which I am supposed to speak. Having just emerged from the New England winter and a preoccupation with a lot of local affairs at the university, I cannot say I have closely followed all of the events of the last several months. I have been somewhat surprised at Chancellor Schmidt's situation because I feel the Social Democrats' stability and control of the government has declined since the election. On the basis of the campaign last fall, I guess I would not have predicted this. However that may be, what I want to try to do is place this discussion today in a more general framework which will be, perhaps, of interest to individuals outside the field of political science. As I understand it, one of the major purposes of this meeting, and of the Institute of German Studies, is to relate studies in political science, and the social sciences in general, to the concerns of people who may be teaching students with a relatively limited background in these areas. Since I was involved in the German Summer School

of the Atlantic--which almost sank beneath the waves--last summer, I am especially aware of the need to present materials for a general audience.

Well, let me get to the question at hand. So far, today, we have had a general discussion of the question: Is West Germany a stable political system? In my view, one should try to relate this question to the preoccupations of people outside the field of political science, for it is one of the things non-German specialists will talk and ask about when they confront the question of Germany or the question of how to present materials on Germany. They will ask: Has Germany changed from the past? Has the basic political and social system changed? Or is there some danger that West Germany might again go off in unpredictable adventures or disasters or changes of one sort or another? This is a general theme which one confronts when talking to people who are not specialists on Germany.

To answer this question in a general context, I think we must compare the United States and West Germany. Is a political system stable? This question is not asked as frequently about the United States--at least not normally--as it is about West Germany. But, why is this the case? How does one account for this? Why should there be more questions about the stability of West Germany than there are about the United States--not only in terms of past history, but also in terms of the actual situation today? I would like to offer a few comments on these questions.

First, both systems seem to combine effectiveness, that is meeting the expectations of the population as to the functions of government, with efficient management. The general population as well as interest groups may be said to expect certain levels of performance. In some cases, however, this may contrast with certain management imperatives, certain objective realities, which are imposed on the leadership of the country. But, on this question, I do not see much difference between West Germany and the United States. In other words, in a time of increasing pressures upon resources and increasing complexity in the management of modern societies, the two countries seem to be rather similar. Hence, one can

say that the United States and West Germany have converged--if one wants to resurrect the convergence theory with regard to the United States and West Germany--on how to combine effectiveness in the minds of the population with efficient management. Nevertheless, it is something one should pay close attention to.

A second factor that one should consider may show more differences between West Germany and the United States. This is the question of the "rapidity"--or indeed whether there is a "rapidity"--in political attitude change in West Germany that goes beyond what we experience in the United States. That is to say, is there a possibility that attitudes about acceptance of the political system could change much more rapidly in West Germany than they would in the United States? We survived the crisis of the Presidency brought on by the Watergate scandal and now we have Mr. Carter, even though very few would have predicted his victory even a year and a half ago. Regardless of what we may think about him or his particular solutions, the very fact that he was normally elected is testimony to a basic stability of attitude. Now, one of the questions frequently raised about West Germany is whether there is an underlying ability to cope with shocks to the psyche of the public. Arnold Heidenheimer mentioned, for example, that just four or five years ago some people were describing the accomplishments of the coalition government in the social policy area as a golden era. Yet, now we hear talk about an alienated mood, a mood that is very critical of the system. Well, this is a fairly rapid shift in mood. Is it merely a media development--it has been discussed in Der Spiegel and other popular publications--or does it indicate something about the underlying condition of the German public psyche? I believe this theme gets at the question of whether the populace of West Germany has found a sort of long term identity. I mean not only an identity with the immediate political system, but a long term identity which will be able to cope with shocks in the objective surroundings. Are they secure enough to know how to intrepret the meaning of these environmental shocks? Are they

able to cope with them without rejecting or questioning the system itself?

One of the main impressions I have gained from talking to people about West Germany is that there tends to be a rather rapid shift in mood. This may not affect the actual functioning of the political system at any given point, but it is a factor that one has to take into account. Might these shifts in mood from optimism to pessimism, this uncertainty about what the future holds, be a more fundamental characteristic of West Germany than it is of the United States? After all, the Germans, to go back historically, have experienced different kinds of regimes and systems in the last 100 years, and one wonders whether this has not had the effect of making people wonder about what is going to happen next and about whether what is going to happen will be consistent with the way they want to live. And, this is different than the American situation.

Now I come to a third theme. In both countries, we witness a demand, among many segments of the population, that decisions be made more democratically. People seem to want to be more involved in determining what is happening to them. This certainly is expressed by such things as the demonstrations against nuclear plants in West Germany and it is expressed in many other ways as well. Now one could say that this is just a characteristic of a small portion of the population. I am not acquainted with the latest opinion polls, but, I think we should see this as a phenomenon of modern or contemporary western culture. In other words, the notion that we should somehow have more control over what is happening to us is a feature that we find in the United States and West Germany.

I guess I am the only one on this panel who actually lives in New England; thus, I am familiar with the town meeting and I also know where Clinton, Massachusetts is. Anyone who has participated in the town meeting--either in an official or unofficial capacity and I have been in them both ways--knows that it can hardly be held up as a paragon of democracy. But, although a political scientist might doubt the notion that participation in a town meeting confers a certain legitimacy on an individual's leadership,

such participation may well meet certain psychological needs in the sense that people can say "Ah yes, this man is doing exactly what we're doing." The point I am getting at is simply that democraticization is a general theme in both societies. In addition, I think there has been what I call a "rediscovery of localism" in West Germany and the United States. This is reflected in the rediscovery of diversity, for example, the rediscovery of ethnicity in the United States.

Both these factors tend to make the management of a political system more difficult. They are centrifugal forces. They are decentralizing forces. They make the job of winning consensus about what to do more difficult because they increase the number of actors, so to speak. If people begin to say "Look, we must have more of a role in decision making" this increases the numbers of interests, and following good old Madison principles, as expressed by James Madison in Federalist Paper Number 10, if the number of interests are increased, the likelihood that there will be an agreement will be decreased. And, I call this a management problem for modern political systems. People expect results from the system, for example pensions and other output, but it is sometimes difficult for the managers of the society to deliver because they have so many increased interests to cope with.

In conclusion, I would say that the United States appears to have certain advantages over West Germany with respect to this problem of managing diversity. First of all, because of the American tradition of private activity, the vast territory, and the number of governments the United States has, all issues do not come to consciousness at the national level and this is a terrific advantage. In Germany, in contrast, a much smaller territory means that local issues may mushroom fairly rapidly into national issues and therefore become critical to the system. So, the United States may be in a better position to manage diversity because of, what I would call, the Madisonian character of the system.

Secondly, there is a leadership factor that has to do with the internal situation of the political parties in West Germany. Specifically, what is the recruitment process for managers, that is, effective managers of modern societies, within the political parties in each country? For example, what is the present situation in the Social Democratic Party with reference to the question of the recruitment of new leadership? And by leadership I do not mean just charismatic figures, whatever that may be, but effective managers. Until very recently, Helmut Schmidt was regarded as the prototype of the effective manager, but now some people view him as ineffectual. Well, how did he emerge? More generally, what are the internal mechanisms by which leaders emerge in both countries. I have a hunch that it is easier for new types of managers to emerge in the United States than it is in Germany, and I suspect this has something to do with the nature of the German parites. The question of leadership is certainly, I think, one of the current issues in both political parties in Germany. The stature, status and reputation for effectiveness of the leaders in these two political parties may be the most immediate problem confronting them.

Diamant: It seems to me that we sometimes tend to forget today that much of the impetus for European integration came from the U.S. and other European powers who were trying to find a framework in which Germany could be contained and supervised during the postwar reconstruction process. As we will recall, no one trusted Germany, or at least that part of Germany we are discussing now. Sometimes, we also tend to forget in our discussions of Germany and the United States that contemporary Germany functions in a European framework in which policymaking has migrated, in some respects, away from the national capital to Brussels, or at least somewhere else, and that this is an aspect of German policymaking that we indeed need to consider. Fortunately, our next discussant, Professor Feld, can remind us of these things and offer some insights about Germany's relationship to Europe and the rest of the world.

Feld: Well, I don't think there is any question that the unification process in Western Europe was stimulated, and strongly supported, by the United States and other countries in Western Europe. In fact, in 1946, Eugene Rostow said that one possible way to control Germany and at the same time bring it back into the society of nations on an equal basis was to promote not only an economic but also a political integration. And, since then the United States has supported this process in different degrees. As you know, when Mr. Mondale went to Brussels he again stressed the support of the United States for integration and President Carter mentioned it just a few weeks ago.

The government of the Federal Republic was, I think, just as eager, after some initial concerns about the control aspects of the European Coal and Steel Community, to adopt the role that really was assigned to it by the United States and the others, that is, to be an important cog in the unification of Europe. And, it felt, perhaps, the same way as the State Department, namely that this was the way it could perhaps expunge, to some extent, the history of 1933 to 1945; in addition, it felt it would become a very acceptable partner in the new European experiment of integration. And, I think that, perhaps until very recently, the federal government has done everything it could to see to it that it would not emerge as the leading power, despite the fact that in terms of economics, as we all know, Germany is the strongest power in Western Europe. There was grumbling among the population, perhaps as early as 1965-66, that Germany was, perhaps, paying more into the European Community than it received in benefits. France, it was pointed out, was always very astute in making sure that the benefits it received somehow matched the costs that went into the European Community system. Very recently, Germany has begun to play a more active role in opposing some of the burdens that have been imposed on it. The Germans have been critical of certain policies that have been developed during the last few years. For instance, they were, and continue to be, critical of the Common Agricultural Policy. They did not like to see the constant increase in prices. In fact, at one point, I think it was about a year or two ago,

Germany, for a short time, prevented a compromise on target prices for agricultural commodities; it finally gave in when the Regional Fund was created which was designed to help the underdeveloped areas of Western Europe. While Germany was happy to pay, perhaps, the largest amount into the Fund, it felt that some benefit should come out of it, and, especially, that France should not be the beneficiary of the Regional Fund. I think that in terms of the benefits that came from the early association with the African countries there was some concern in Germany that this was primarily a means of continuing French influence in Africa and that the actual commercial benefits were rather limited. This has now changed, to some extent.

If we look at the public opinion surveys that are now being conducted every six months by the Commission under Monsieur Rabier, we see a very, very slow but consistent reduction of support for European political integration in West Germany. Although it is difficult to judge how much these particular surveys mean, it is interesting that the most consistent strong support for integration is found, at the present time, in Italy. Perhaps the Italian situation, that is the fragmentation of the Italian governmental and political system, provides a clue for understanding this; perhaps the Italians long for a different and more stable government than the one they have at home. If we accept this explanation, we might say that, up to a certain time, the German attitude toward the European Community was quite similar; that is, it was viewed as a very desirable alternative to what existed in Germany. The German government was not fragmented, but there was, perhaps, the feeling that after all the difficulties of the thirties and forties a European government would, perhaps, be the best government Germany could have. So, given current attitudes, I think a definite change is going on. It is a very gradual, very subtle change, but it is visible not only in the public opinion polls, but also in the government. But, because it is so gradual and subtle, one really cannot tell what will happen. I have the feeling, though, that the Common Market has reached a plateau, and that it is going to have some kind of support for many years to come, regardless of what

happens to direct elections. These are, I think, still somewhat up in the air, despite the fact that Italy, both in the Senate and the House of Deputies, has given almost unanimous support to them.

Let me move now to a few comments about some other German international attitudes, especially with regard to cooperation with the United States. In many areas of policy, for example, toward the Third World and toward NATO, there is very close cooperation and cohesion between Germany and the United States. The "Leper" tank may create some problems, but I do not think they will be major. There may also be a certain amount of reluctance on the part of Germany to create a higher level of economic development during the next year to help its partners inside and outside the Community, but I think it is going to be done and that there is going to be some compromise.

With regard to the question of nuclear proliferation, I would like to relate some experiences I had about four weeks ago in Germany. I was giving a series of lectures on American foreign policy toward European unification to primarily academic audiences. Although I tried to avoid the subject of nuclear non-proliferation, especially with regard to the contract between Germany and Brazil to establish a ten billion dollar nuclear industry, the question invariably came up in every lecture. I tried to argue that Carter's position is one that is steeped in his particular moral concerns and that this could be a new departure for American foreign policy that could be very useful for everyone. The question, however, was always asked: how can we afford to lose thousands of jobs because of such a policy? I sensed that this issue was particularly difficult and that a compromise would probably be quite difficult. The Carter puzzle is something that has not been overcome. I tried to argue that considering the history of the 1930's,Germany ought to, in fact, follow the American example and place its foreign policy on a moral basis; I argued that regardless of the consequences, such a procedure would help German foreign policy. But, there was no possibility of persuading anybody in my audience that this would be a proper approach.

Hence, in the three areas I have mentioned, NATO, common defense and economic policy, and especially in the non-proliferation policy that the United States is now pursuing, we may see some divergences between the United States and the Federal Republic. I am not privy to what has happened in the private discussions between Germany, Brazil and the United States. I would simply like to mention that I thought the coverage that was given this problem in many German newspapers was quite fair. For instance, in Die Welt it was pointed out that the United States had imposed restrictions on Westinghouse, which was also negotiating on this particular contract, that prevented it from providing a reprocessing plant which would produce plutonium.

In closing, let me say something about the problem of alienation from politics. I think it was called Staatsverdrossenheit. I think this is something we find in both the United States and Germany. I think it is a problem of the aggregation of interests, a problem of interest groups determining policies. It is a reflection of the new emergence of corporatism, not, perhaps, in the sense in which it was talked about in the 1920's, or, perhaps, in the sense that Mr. Mussolini had in mind. It is a problem, really, of two democracies which operate in a type of pluralistic manner. I think it is a very serious problem because we are not only talking about a reduction in the legitimacy of the political system, but also about how the public, as a whole, feels separated from the political process. I think it could produce very serious consequences unless, perhaps, the public can understand that the theory of pluralism does not mean that we have a number of private governments in our countries. I think the issue of corporatism needs to be investigated not only in Germany and the United States but in all western democracies and the role of the news media plays in this whole process needs to be carefully examined.

New Speaker: There has been some general discussion of German stability and of the educational system in Germany. Both Professors Heidenheimer and Wildenmann have addressed themselves to this question. I personally share

their views that the German political system is stable and, in fact, in comparison to other European countries is exceptionally stable. On the other hand, we know that there are centrifugal forces in all these societies, including our own. And one of the questions I have deals with the educational system. Professor Heidenheimer explained, and I would agree, that American students have never had the expectations the German students have had with respect to finding employment in accordance with their educational backgrounds. I think one reason for this is obviously that in the United States we have had a mass educational system and in Germany we have not had a mass educational system until very recently. Some recent studies that I have read suggest that in Germany one of the reasons that students expected to find jobs was that there was a rough balance between the percentages of people going to the university and the percentage of positions that were available. These expectations, therefore, became cemented over a period of centuries. In contrast, in the United States we tended to always produce a much larger percentage of people than we really needed in academic positions and that has led to lesser expectations. Now, the question I have is this. If it is true that today about 23 percent of an age group are in educational institutions beyond the basic schools, in contrast to about seven percent 11 or 12 years ago, and it is true that the percentage of academically trained people that the society needs remains at about six percent, then what are we going to do with the other 15, 16, 17 percent of these students who are leaving the university, going into the marketplace, and not finding positions? We know traditionally that about 60 percent have gone into the bureaucracy. These positions are being frozen. Indeed, bureaucratic positions are actually declining in some areas. So, we have got all these students that are leaving the university with very high expectations with respect to employment, and not only are they not likely to be employed in the bureaucracy, they are not likely to be employed anywhere. My own personal experience last year in talking with students was that many, especially the more left wing students, completely rejected the idea of working in the private sector. Yet, it seems as though this is going to be

the only possibility open to them. And, so my question really is, to what extent do you see these large numbers of German students, who are unable to find positions in the marketplace commensurate with their backgrounds, constituting a potential factor for instability? Many of my German friends say, "Well, they're going to become very nice Buergers in the future." I am not so sure. In talking to them personally, I am not sure they are going to assimilate very easily into the West German society.

Wildenmann: Well, this is an interesting question. First, let me straighten out a few figures. It is true that the number of students going into higher education has increased about 20 percent; it varies a bit from state to state but it is about 21 to 23 percent. The increase, however, is much stronger in the middle class than in the working class, and we should bear this in mind. This increase has occurred as a result of a planned policy which, to a considerable degree, diminished or almost abolished the differentiation in our education system. Now they are trying to go back. But, the point is that this policy increased all the expectations. The feeling was that if one went to the university, one was settled with regard to status, income and so on. But, the system simply has not been able to absorb the increase in a clever, intelligent way.

A second point I would like to make is that we still have to face the fact that our youngsters are in school too long. They remain in school until they are 28 and they have never seen any sort of activity where they could test their abilities and develop as a personality. Hence, one of the principal things in my mind would be to restructure the system considerably. We cannot afford to have these people in the education system so long. The American system, in this sense, is much more elastic. It is, of course, hard, in the light of the German tradition, to reduce, for instance, the time a youngster spends in high school, but this would be necessary. The reform has to start now, even though the number of students will decrease in about 1985. The question is still the same. We also need to consider the question of the class composition of higher education. Some of our people

in Mannheim have conducted some studies on this, and they have determined that, in the last 70 years, the relative educational chances for the lower class have decreased, even though, in absolute terms, they have increased.

With reference to your question about professional positions for university graduates, let me comment on the case of teachers. The state has a monopoly here. This is a very important fact. And, in view of the current zero--almost negative--population growth, school enrollments are--and will continue to--declining. Hence, we are likely to have a lot of unemployed teachers. Indeed, there is the danger that we will have ten thousand unemployed teachers in the state of Baden-Württemberg in a very short time. This is a very serious fact, and it is important for the expectations that people, who are going into higher education, have. They think when they take the Staatsexamen they will be well set. Then, they expect to become Referendar. This time is over and one of our problems is to convince not only the students but also some members of the faculty, particularly those who have been trained in the idealist German tradition, that this is the case. They must realize that their task is not simply to educate new teachers.

With respect to other aspects of your question, I would point out that no one can say that only about six percent of our population will need to be academically trained in the future. These are highly speculative projections. Educated people, however, should not expect that they will have a guaranteed job. They have to be taught, even in the universities, that they should have the flexibility to build their own jobs. This, of course, means curricula reform and things like that.

The most important part of your question concerned the impact of unemployed--or inappropriately--employed university graduates on German stability, and on this I am not sure what the answer is. We would like to do a small study on it in the near future, at least I am pressing for it. We did a study in the 1960's and it gave us some information about the kinds of problems people were thinking about. A hypothesis I have is

that the youngsters already have decreasing life expectations; they feel that things are going to be very hard. It is a diffuse kind of anxiety; for example, at 20 or 21 years old they already care a great deal about a pension system. This increasing anxiety about life expectations is an individualized feeling, but it could produce mass demonstrations, and it certainly could produce a milieu for organized groups to exploit. The mobilization of restless people has been, so to speak, one of the aims of such groups. The problem for governmental policy is to avoid creating new foci for mobilization.

Finally, I really have to stress what I said in my talk. A number of people have had some very good ideas that could be implemented. But, we must realize that, since 1968, the winner of the so-called university reform has been the bureaucracy. More and more we are confronted, politically speaking, with the "secularized church," as I sometimes call it. In the half year I have been in office, I have received a pile of orders from the ministry. I have never seen this before. I mean it is like dust coming down. This is high bureaucratization and one cannot make rational decisions because one cannot control it. There is no rational way out and the cultural ministers themselves are not in a position to do anything.

Apart from questions like the reform of governments and universities, the major problem is to restructure the education system. To me, this is one of the most important and biggest issues we face. We cannot afford to spoil a whole generation as we did in the sixties.

New Sp[illegible]ar: I am interested in this point about differentiation in the educational system because I have heard from people working at the Free University that there has been a marked shift even in the past couple of months. Now, there is an emphasis on funding for more Berufsbildung. There has been a shift toward emphasizing programs that stress vocational training. It seems to me that a traditional problem in German education is class differentiation; traditionally, it has been people from the upper classes who have been able to attend the university and the attempts to broaden

admission programs have not really been that effective. The whole Dortman report does not deal with any kind of SES differences. It is still the folks who can afford the better Gymnasium educations who are getting in. It seems to me that by expanding Berufsbildung, that is, by contributing more funds to vocational training, class conflict is being redefined or set up again, because it will again be the students from the upper classes who will be able to attend the university and those who will be able to take advantage of the Berufsbildung will come from the lower and middle classes. What kinds of differentiation do you see or don't you think this will affect the stability of the system?

Wildenmann: This differentiated structure has long been one of the important elements of the German education system. Certainly, I would be the last to deny that there was a class structure in our education system. I am probably one of the few individuals in Germany who went from elementary school to the university without high school. But, the groundwork of our education system was this differentiation. We had not only universities, but also engineering schools, although these schools were sometimes incorporated in the universities as in the United States. In the last ten years, however, this structure has been, as I said, diminished or even abolished, and, now, there is an effort to return to the differentiation. There is certainly the danger that we may reinstitute the class structure. At least we have to be attentive to this problem. As I said before, the relative chances of higher education for the working class have not increased. There might be a push coming, and, as you said, there might be a redefining of class conflict. I would not deny it or exclude it as one of the possibilities. But, it could be much better, and it could be done in a very clever way. But, it must start with the school system. I have to stress that. It will not work without a reform of our school system. There is no other way.

New Speaker: It seems to me that, at least in the United States, mass education was meant to be an education in one's civic duties. We would be educated to appreciate democracy. It has been noted that the traditional German system may, perhaps, continue, despite reform, and that only the aristocracy, in essence, will be able to go to the universities. England tried to solve this problem, if I am correct, by putting an elite in the university system on the basis of merit. They attempted to define merit at roughly the age of 11 or 12; hence, children who did not show academic talents were simply siphoned off into the vocational tract. Now, it seems to me that unless--and this is especially true for Germany--one can educate the masses for democracy, one will never overcome the sense of alienation from the state or the belief that the system only perpetuates an elite. I do not know how one solves the problem of educating the masses, perhaps by keeping them in school until they become people who can make value judgments, who can understand the world they live in. If we only educate people vocationally we will only turn out Fachidioten, and that goes for university professors as well. Unless we have this kind of broad education--traditional liberal arts--how will we ever understand this world in which we live?

New Speaker: One thought has occurred to me. Recently, at the University of Toronto, I spoke to some people who had taught at universities in the United States. One remark a fellow made struck me. He said "At all the universities in the United States at which I taught, when one asked students what they would be doing six, eight or ten years from now, many, at least in political science, did not know." "Here," he said, "the situation is completely different. The students know what they are going to be doing or at least they think they should know." In other words, I am not sure it is just a German thing. It is related to the European type of education and this has been carried on in Canada. Democratic education in Germany might have less to do with the type of people who go to the university and more to do with the character of the education, that is, how much people are prepared to live with uncertainties, how much they are prepared to see

contingencies. But that may be related to the size of the territory and the opportunities we have in the United States. This may be unique to the U.S. and not present in Germany.

Heidenheimer: I think we have to recognize that a lot of our classification of educational systems is colored by democratic ideologies, and when we look more closely at these little boxes, we find that the graduates of certain institutions in this country, for instance, the graduates of Harvard Law, are almost as sure of their tracks as the graduates of European universities. Indeed, this is what differentiates them from the graduates of Western Kentucky and other places.

Beyond this, we have to recognize that the traditional European pattern, which we have all been discussing, is coming to an end because of the conjuncture of rapid growth in the higher education system and slower growth and restriction in the public sector. The question is what is it going to change into and how effective are the educational systems going to be in adapting in ways that will, in effect, change the linkage between academic training and social stratification. And, here I think the potential positive contributions of German higher education have been a sort of victim of the political and generational polarization of the sixties. Because of this, many of the original ideas have not come to fruition. I think the basic problem is one of traditional competition for the more desirable positions and the kinds of educational credentials that aid in this competition. There is going to be a more intensive competition for these more prestigious, salaried, tenured positions in the seventies. The question is how much do you weigh the various kinds of educational credentials that are presented for the various job openings and job continuations. And, here, I think the problem has been that, as a reaction to the student revolt, the academic establishment has lined up with the rest of the establishment and reinforced the traditional credentials. This is reflected, I think, in the pervasive use--overuse in my view--of the doctor title. And, if entry to the university is made easier for middle class kids who come through the conventional

route of the Gymnasium and the Abitur, the completion will undoubtedly be tilted against claimants from the lower classes who have less of a chance in this route.

Hence, if I were the next CDU cultural minister, I would, perhaps, introduce a motion to abolish the public display of the doctor title. This has been done in Sweden where they have expanded and somewhat downgraded the meaning of the old doctor title. They also made it infeasible to use the doctor title in telephone directories a few years ago. Until then, all titles and occupations were listed; this has now been dropped and only names are listed. Titles and achievements are now used more the way they are in this country, that is, covertly.

If I were the next CDU labor minister I might replicate another American innovation. A lot of the graduates of the Ivy League universities I went to are running hotels in the Bahamas, New Orleans and so on, and this does not seem to have seriously endangered the relative status of these particular institutions. Hotel management seems to be an area where German management has not made a breakthrough. It might therefore be worthwhile for one of the culture ministers to attempt to establish high status institutes at one of the high status universities, for example Heidelberg or Mannheim. This might provide a motivation for capable, ambitious and intellectually potent members of the various cohorts to join the elite of German managers who are running efficient, clean and attractive hotels on the Tunesian or Mediterranean coast or somewhere else.

Baker: Just a quick response to the previous question. First of all, I do not think we can say that they do not make any efforts at all in this area. There is a thing called the Gemeinschaftskunde which is taught in the German lower schools, not in the secondary schools. According to available research, there is apparently some difficulty with these courses in terms of their content, coverage and effectiveness. But, at least there is some recognition that such courses are important. Still, we must remember the findings of American research which suggest that such courses may not have the effects we expect them to.